Tag Archives: CVE

MotionEye Config Info Disclosure

Edit: This was given CVE-2022-25568. As mentioned in my previous posts here and here, I’ve done a little digging into the conditions that are required for the MotioneEye config file to be world viewable, and I’ve reached this conclusion:

As long as a “user” password is not set, the config file will be world readable. Even if an “admin” password has been set, the /config/list file will still be readable by everybody. So, while someone could think they are doing the correct thing by creating a password for the admin user, they may still be leaking private information. Here is a innocuous example from a live instance:

As you can see in this picture, IP addresses/services/passwords are exposed. This is a rather innocuous example, being that it is an internal IP address, but it illustrates how this could be an issue. Imagine if those were your public FTP server credentials. Or if they were your gmail credentials for smtp notifications. The list goes on.

Along with usernames, passwords, auth keys, and email addresses, these config files also contain less sensitive information like internal network IP addresses and URLs, drive and mounting information.

In many ways this vulnerability may be worse that the MotionEye RCE vulnerability that I reported and received a CVE for. In that case, the admin password needed to be left blank (or easily guessed) for someone to get into the admin panel and achieve RCE. In this case, a user could think they’re being secure by setting an admin password, but they leave the user password blank – and the config remains viewable.

I’ve found gmail, gdrive, ftp, sftp, telegram stuff (not sure how auth works there), etc. all exposed to the WWW in these files.

I’ve submitted an issue on the MotionEye github page, but if it is anything like last time, they don’t plan on fixing it/see it as a non-issue.

Edit: The issue was closed before I even finished this post.

Edit: The issue was reopened and I submitted a pull request to fix the issue, although my fix was not tested much, so it may not work properly.

Update: Hacking MotionEye – CVE-2021-44255

I was given CVE-2021-44255 for this – authenticated RCE via a malicious tasks (python pickle) file. So that’s fun. Even though it is authenticated, the default username is admin and the default password is blank, so you know how these things go. I actually haven’t heard of any MotionEye instances being used in botnets or anything.

I should probably request a CVE for the unauthenticated information disclosure that I found, but I need to do some more research on that one.

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44255

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44255

CVE-2021-35959 Stored XSS in Folder Contents on Plone 5-5.2.4

I’ve been testing some new Python-based CMSs and CMS-like software. I’ve heard of Plone before, but I never had a chance to check it out until now. I was a couple of days into my experimenting when I ran across this issue.

I have to say, the Plone team’s response was great. I got an almost immediate response from the security team, and a hotfix was pushed less than a week later.

Please see the following links for more information.